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ABSTRACT
This paper is a study of the effects of foreign aid on perceptions of political corruption in
Sub-Saharan Africa. In keeping with the consensus on foreign aid effectiveness, this study
proposed that Sub-Saharan African countries receiving more foreign aid would be more likely to
maintain high levels of perceived corruption. Hypotheses were tested using multivariate
regression, controlling for a number of factors which have shown to be influential on perceptions
of political corruption. Two models were tested, one to show the regression over a period of nine
years, and the other to show the relationship between the foreign aid and perceptions of
corruption over one year. The tests resulted in showing a significantly negative relationship over
nine years, but foreign aid lost its significance with perceptions of political corruption over one
year. The most influential variable on political corruption in both models was the level of
political rights in a country, which indicated a significantly negative relationship between the
two variables.
The paper also looked at Nigeria in a case study focusing on the effects of foreign aid on
governance and economic policy environments, corruption being a major factor in both of these.
This study resulted in the conclusion that increases in foreign aid paralleled improved
perceptions of political corruption, and that Nigeria’s reform initiative during the Obasanjo
regime (1999-2007) was the major determining factor in this perception shift.
Overall, this study supports the consensus that foreign aid given to countries with reformminded governments is more likely to contribute to the fight against corruption.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF CORRUPTION AND
FOREIGN AID
Corruption and Foreign Aid
Corruption in the Third World is becoming an increasingly discussed topic – especially
for political scientists with an interest in international relations. Endemic corruption cripples
political, economic and social development because it is both a product and a producer of
poverty. Several studies have shown the negative effect that corruption has on development; it is
no coincidence that the most undeveloped countries of the world are also the ones which suffer
from the most endemic corruption. 1 Those invested in developing the Third World (for both
humanitarian and economic purposes) have recognized the relevance of this powerful setback,
and recent times have seen a growing interest in corruption and anti-corruption policies.
Foreign aid, trade, and financial investment are often seen as positive forces for Third
World development – a redistribution of resources from the richest to the poorest countries.
Because they “hold the purse strings”, lending and aid institutions believe that through their
financial assistance, they can influence a country’s actions towards corruption. While many of
the entities (ranging from individual governments to multinational charities) loaning – or giving those billions of dollars do it for humanitarian, political and developmental reasons; they also
realize the power that their money holds for recipients of their aid. 2 For example, anti-corruption
policy is a major component of the World Bank’s lending agenda because it knows that the
eradication of corruption is crucial to development. Even more in recent times, organizations like
the World Bank and IMF have committed themselves to curbing corruption through their lending
1

Alesina and Weder (1999), p.5
The history of foreign aid has shown that the “developmental objectives of aid programs have been distorted by the
use of aid for donor commercial and political advantage”, write Peter Hjertholm and Howard White. Foreign Aid
and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future (2000) p.25
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and aid programs. Major donor countries are also focusing on using aid to implement reform
programs in the Third World. In presenting his Millennium Challenge Goals, President Bush has
said, that “greater contributions from developed nations must be linked to greater responsibility
from developing nations”. 3
For all of its good intentions, the developed world and its foreign aid have not made
dramatic improvements in curbing corruption in the Third World, this is especially so for Africa.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries have similar experiences with corruption that they had ten
years ago - a grim pattern which has greatly affected their overall development. Billions of
dollars have been invested in and given to these countries, but starvation, under-education, poor
healthcare, corruption and under-development remain major problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. 4
While this region remains the poorest in the world, it also remains the most corrupt. 5 Whether it
is due to squandering resources, or powerful governments (and leaders) keeping resources for
their own benefit instead of for the sustainable development of their country, or an unattractive
foreign investment environment – corruption has been known to prevent foreign aid from
achieving its intended goals in this region.
Due to the lack of clear improvements, many have shed doubt on the effectiveness of aid
with “strings attached”. There are those who believe that aid with proper conditionalities is a

3

See the White House official website at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html
Sanjeev Gupta et al (2006), p.1 shows that ODA (official development assistance) to Sub-Saharan Africa alone
averaged about $17 billion a year during 2000-2003. According to the 2006 Human Development Report, SSA
remains the region with the most people living below the poverty line ($1 a day).
http://hdr.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/23.html
5
According to the 2006 Human Development Report, SSA remains the region with the most people living below the
poverty line ($1 a day). http://hdr.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/23.html. According to Transparency
International’s 2006 CPI, SSA countries made up 9 out of the 20 most corrupt countries in the world – the most of
any region.
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very powerful tool in combating corruption. 6 Then there are those who are convinced that aid
given to corrupt governments only fuels corruption, and that the donors are not as precise as they
profess to be in their lending (in another words, they often give aid to corrupt governments). 7
I will be looking at the relationship between foreign aid and perceptions of political
corruption in my thesis. 8 Specifically, my research question is, “What is the impact of foreign
aid on perceptions of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa?” By focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa – a
region that is plagued with corruption and foreign aid dependency – this study furthers the
application of research to the realities of policy. Further statistical tests focusing on foreign aid
will contribute to the existing political corruption research, and provide vital information for
future research. Much research has been done on the effects that foreign aid has on influencing
recipients to enact development and governance reform, but few studies have focused on
corruption specifically; this lack of research makes this study particularly important.

Structure of Thesis
Chapter 1: This chapter will give the reader a solid idea of what corruption is, and the part it
plays in the developing world. It will look at different definitions of corruption, but I will follow
the common acceptance of the definition “Corruption is the misuse of public office for private
gain.” It will also introduce foreign aid as a concept and how it has been applied to the
developing world, as well as list some examples of corruption. This chapter will put the problem
of corruption into perspective (the problems for development, etc). It will also briefly discuss

6

Oxfam International (2005), “Increasing Aid Goes Hand in Hand with Fighting Corruption”, Also see Jose Tavares
(2001).
7
Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder (1999), “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”
8
Because of the reliance on statistics derived from perceptions of corruption, most studies use the term perceptions
of corruption and corruption interchangeably. I address some of the issues surrounding using perceptions of
corruption as a measurement of corruption in Chapter 3 – Methodology and Sources.

3

foreign aid, reasons for lending (i.e. donor motivations), conditionalities, and how foreign aid has
been shown to contribute to (or reduce) corruption.
Chapter 2: This chapter will be a literature review of the major works done on foreign aid’s
effects on levels of corruption. It will look at various findings on foreign aid’s effectiveness in
the development of good governance and policy reforms. This chapter will define the consensus
that has formed from studies of foreign aid’s effectiveness in battling corruption and furthering
development.
Chapter 3: An in-depth description of the hypothesis, variables/data, sources and methodology.
Chapter 4: This chapter will be devoted to the quantitative research testing the consensus theory
of the relationship between foreign aid and perceptions of corruption. It will report the results of
the statistical analysis, and the correlation between perceptions of corruption and foreign aid, as
well as several other control variables.
Chapter 5: This chapter will be devoted to the qualitative research concerning Nigeria.
Chapter 6: Chapter 6 will further explore the findings of chapters 4 and 5 and answer questions,
such as: has the statistical analysis shown that foreign aid contributes to perceptions of increasing
corruption? And when we apply the theory that foreign aid fuels corruption in corrupt countries
to Nigeria, does it explain the changes in perceptions of corruption in that country? This chapter
will summarize the findings and suggest their implications.

4

CHAPTER 1 – CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN AID – CONCEPTS AND
DEFINITIONS
Corruption
Corruption itself is “a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes and
effects, as it takes on various forms and functions in different contexts.” 9 An act of corruption
can be anything from a country’s leader redirecting money meant for a development project into
a secret Swiss bank account, to an office clerk quickly pushing through a contract for a
businessman because the businessman paid him extra money to do so. Most accept the idea of
corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. This is the definition used by the World
Bank, Transparency International, and many analysts. 10 However, there are other (more
elaborate) definitions of corruption. One example is Mushtaq Khan’s definition, who writes that
corruption is “behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of
someone in a position of public authority because of private reasons -regarding motives such as
wealth, power or status.” 11
Most research on corruption has centered on the state and, as such, has defined corruption
as a state-society relationship. 12 Corruption can affect all levels of state, and the two major
categories of governmental corruption are political and bureaucratic. Political corruption takes
place in the highest levels of government. Because of its incredible effects, political corruption
has also been known as grand corruption. It occurs when the highest ranking political decision-

9

Andvig et al (2000), p.10
Ibid, p.11
11
Ibid, p.12
12
Ibid, p.10
10
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makers exploit their positions of power to build personal fortunes. 13 Their actions can range
from skimming money off the top of major contracts for development projects to embezzlement
from the public treasury. Perhaps even more detrimental to development, corrupt leaders often
formulate policies and legislation to consolidate their personal power – thus solidifying
corruption’s hold on a state.
If political corruption is “high”, then bureaucratic corruption is “low” because it affects
the public more directly than that corruption at the highest levels of government. This kind of
corruption resides in the lower levels of government (“the implementation end of politics”).
“Low” corruption includes bureaucratic corruption, but extends to public services as well. 14
People encounter this corruption when they go to the hospital, their children go to school, when
they go to the police station (or the police come to them), or go to a government office for a
business, drivers, or marriage license. Individually, these bribes often don’t amount to much - but
for the very poor, these bribes can mean a rejection of necessary services if they cannot afford to
pay.
While the word does have a widely accepted definition, corruption occurs in many
different forms. Bribery (simply defined as any form of payment made by corrupt means) is the
type of corruption which many international corporations and aid agencies encounter in a corrupt
country – and most often they pay the bribes in order to make things pass more swiftly (or pass
at all). Embezzlement is the theft of resources by those who are in charge of administering them.
Fraud is an economic crime that involves some kind of deceit – a distortion of information or
facts. Extortion is money or other resources extracted by the use of violence or force. Favoritism
13
14

Ibid, p.18
Ibid, p.18
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occurs when there is a corrupted distribution of resources - when state officials and politicians
give preferential treatment to certain people or companies. Nepotism occurs when a politician or
ruler appoints positions of power to family members. 15
Many accept that the overall consequences of corruption are negative, but we need to
take a closer look at the causes and consequences of this problem. Much of the work done on
corruption has been in relation to the causes of corruption. Susan Rose- Ackerman bluntly wrote
that “widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning poorly.” 16 As we now
know, a highly corrupt country does not just suffer from political corruption in its highest
ranking leaders – corruption seeps into the lowest levels of government as well. In fact, in highly
corrupt countries, both bureaucratic and political corruption exist as one.
Because the study of corruption is largely centered on the state, it is important to address
the unique problems of the Sub-Saharan African state. John Mbaku wrote extensively on the
topic of the state and corruption, especially pertaining to Africa. He attributed the widespread
acceptance of statism by the post-colonial African leaders for the strength of corruption on the
continent. Statism is “a developmental model that emphasizes government control of resource
allocation, minimized the functions of the market, and granted the state significant power to
intervene in private exchange, as well as to own and control productive resources.” 17 The
choices for this policy were made out of a need for security in the “war against mass poverty and
deprivation” but have resulted (50 years later) in a bloated state where politicians and civil
servants have “turned governance structures into instruments of plunder to enrich themselves at

15

Ibid, pp.14-18
Rose-Ackerman, The Role of the World Bank, p.1
17
Mbaku (2003), p. 217
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the expense of society.” 18 Combined with the popular choice of a one-party political system,
most African countries have lived with 50 years of strong central governments with non
democratic political systems. Mbaku attributes these structures to the entrenchment of
corruption, poverty, and violence in Africa. 19 Others have pointed to the acceptance of the
“Personal Rule Paradigm” by many SSA rulers as the main form of politics for the reasons
behind Africa’s stalled development. 20 Because a key feature of patrimonial rule is that public
office is treated as personal property, “public office becomes a means for extracting private
wealth”. 21 The prevalence of patrimonial, centralized states is largely seen as a consequence of
colonialism – which left behind “a weak and fractured political landscape.” 22
On the scale of low level corruption, many have pointed to the fact that often bureaucratic
workers in highly corrupt governments are underpaid, overworked, poorly trained, and subject to
extortion themselves as causes for the widespread bureaucratic corruption. 23
If poverty, selfishness, and poor institutions are causes of corruption, then they are also
the consequences. Stanislav Andreski lists no less than five effects of corruption in his book
Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America. First, corruption impedes economic
growth and development (because the money is not being reinvested in development and
maintenance). Second, corruption stifles entrepreneurialism and the development of the private
18

Ibid, p.218
Ibid, p.218
20
Leonard and Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures, p.2
21
Ibid, p.3
22
Ibid, p.8. Leonard and Strauss write that the slave trade definitely contributed to the problem of weak states in
SSA because it had the “effect of encouraging compact raiding political units that rendered larger states
unattractive…African political elites who built strong militaries during the transatlantic slave trade could gain much
more from raiding and selling the labor power of their neighbors than they could from incorporating those families
into their territories….the loss of many productive members of society, the destructive penetration of the African
hinterlands, and the political conflicts that the slave trade inspired or intensified had a significant negative impact on
the continent’s state development.”
23
Andreski, p.78
19
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economy (because those looking to make money find it less lucrative to take a chance in business
than to go into the public sector where corruption supplements income). Third, the
developmental decisions of the government are distorted by corrupt interests instead of the real
needs of the country. Fourth, corruption weakens administrative capacity (the competition for
corrupt proceeds can lead to inter/intra departmental rivalry, and there is a low morale because of
this fragmentation combined with the frequency of other acts of corruption like nepotism). Fifth,
and finally, corruption undermines democracy (as the over-riding goal of those seeking office is
often to “capture power and keep the fortress of public power”, and often the voting process is so
corruptible that it does not reflect a valid account of public sentiment). 24
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most corrupted regions of the world. 25 It is sadly ironic
that this is also one of the most resource-rich regions in the world– an attribute that has turned
into a drawback in relation to corruption, as many leaders have succumbed to the desire to build
personal fortunes at the expense of the country. Despite its potential to generate its own wealth,
poor development has made the region incredibly reliant on foreign aid for the survival of its
people.

Foreign Aid
In Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty and underdevelopment have remained a mainstay since
the independence of most of its countries from colonialism in the 1950s. Because of this state of
affairs, the region also has been a major recipient of foreign aid. This section will describe
foreign aid, those who give and receive it, and how elements of foreign aid can impact a country.
24

Andreski, pp.125-129
According to Transparency International’s 2006 CPI, SSA countries made up 9 out of the 20 most corrupt
countries listed – thus it was the most represented region in the 20 most corrupt countries on the CPI scale.
25
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Governmental, non-governmental, multi-national and non-profit organizations are the
major donors that play a part in the transfer of funds from those with money to those in need.
While reasons for donating or lending money vary as much as those entities who give it, the
largest amount of money given as foreign aid originates in government and multinational
organizations in the form of official development assistance. Over 106 billion U.S dollars in net
official development assistance (ODA) were disbursed in 2005 alone. 26 For most countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, ODA is the largest single capital inflow – making up nearly half of all net
capital inflows. 27
Foreign aid is most often directly linked to development, and the intentions of aid change
as the doctrines of development change. 28 Since the ending of the colonial system in the 1940s
and 50s, the ideas of Third World development have undergone many changes, and so the
objectives of foreign aid have changed as well. In the 1940s, foreign aid was directed at
reconstruction and planning - in reflection of the aftermath of WWII. 29 From the 1950s to the
1990s, foreign aid and development have been focused on targets ranging from improving the
capabilities of investment and GDP per capita (through building up the national savings rates of
Third World countries) 30 in the 1950s, to focusing on the heavy debt burden of underdeveloped
countries in the 1980s, to focusing on structural adjustment and poverty alleviation in the 1990s
and 2000s. 31

26

OECD statistics: www.oecd.org/document search ‘Aid flows top USD 100 billion in 2005’.
Making Aid Work (2006)
28
Thorbecke, p.17
29
Hjertholm and White, p.81
30
Thorbecke, p.22
31
Ibid, pp.19-45
27
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However, to believe that foreign aid is given only for developmental reasons would be
naïve. Hjertholm and White write that “the developmental objectives of aid programs have been
distorted by the use of aid for donor commercial and political advantage.” 32 There is a
substantial body of work that proposes that foreign aid has actually served to subjugate
developing countries to the West through development programs dominated by Western terms –
a post-colonial imperialism, if you will. One example is Tom Callaghy’s assertion that foreign
aid dependency is simply a continuation of Africa’s economic marginalization and dependence
on the Western-dominated world economy. 33 In Africa, foreign aid dependence has been cited as
an impediment to real economic and political development because “the current aid system
wastes much national energy and political capital in interacting with donor agencies, and
distracts African governments from domestic debate and consensus building.” 34 Foreign aid has
also been cited as a facilitator of corruption because aid “increases the size of resources fought
over by interest groups” and “delays the adoption of policy reforms.” 35 The combination of
structural adjustment programs (determined by institutions dominated by the Western agenda),
aid dependency and the continuation of corruption lead many to question the virtue of the current
foreign aid system.
The poorest countries – with their often underdeveloped and inadequate infrastructures –
are the most in need of development. Foreign aid provides an opportunity for those in need to
achieve that development. It also provides an opportunity for donors to encourage their own
methods of development (those most often being tailored to the ideals of free market economics).
32

Hjertholm, p.81
Thomas Callaghy “Africa in the World Political Economy”, Haberson and Rothchild’s Africa in World Politics,
p.44
34
Ravi Kanbur, “Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa”, found in “Foreign Aid and
Development”(Hjertholm),p.419
35
Alesina and Weder, p.3
33
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Being a donor gives one a certain amount of power, and often that power is expressed in the
form of conditionalities. Conditionalities are conditions for change attached to a loan or grant.
These conditions are often directed at political (for developing good governance), economic (for
opening up markets and reducing state control over the economy), developmental (for building
infrastructure), and humanitarian reforms.
“Strings-attached” lending is at the heart of the debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid.
Those who see foreign aid as a vehicle for positive change believe that conditionalities are a
necessity for influencing leaders who would not otherwise devote resources to improvement for
the entire country. The debate over conditionalities is not whether they are a good idea or not,
but rather if they are truly effective. Corruption is an important aspect of this debate – largely
because it is a major target of conditionalities, and also a reason why they do not succeed. The
following chapter will elaborate on the debate over aid effectiveness.

12

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Foreign aid is intended to alleviate poverty and encourage development. Some argue that
while foreign aid is not as effective as they would like, it is still helping to keep many people
from complete starvation and does contribute to Third World development. However, many
others argue that foreign aid is at best being misappropriated and at worst feeding the problems
which it is intended to fix. The disparity between the amount of aid being given to developing
countries and the lack of improvements in development in many of those countries is something
which has led many scholars, aid agencies and donors to question foreign aid’s effectiveness.

The Consensus
Empirical work on the effectiveness of aid has largely been critical. The subject of aid
effectiveness has been studied from many different aspects, but especially from that of its
effectiveness in building good governance and good policy environments. A good policy
environment consists of good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. 36 Good governance consists of
efficient institutions (which establish a predictable, impartial and consistently enforced set of
rules) that are crucial for the development of the economy and society. 37 Donors claim that their
aid pushes governments to reform their governance and policy environments into those which
encourage development and openness. Countries which have good governance and policy
environments are able to regulate the inhibitors to growth; corruption being a major inhibitor.
Conditioning aid is seen as a major tool for encouraging good governance, development, and
humanitarian reform – in fact, conditions attached to aid is the prominent tool that donors use to

36
37

Ibid, p.847
Knack (2001), p.311
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push reform. The problem is that the empirical consensus largely points to the failure of
conditionality. 38
Much of the literature on foreign aid and corruption points to the conclusion that aid is
not effective in stopping corruption, and many argue that the way foreign aid is given now
actually fuels corruption. These findings are significant because they counter the arguments that
lending and donating money positively affects the governance policies of recipient countries.
Earlier studies began with questions of aid effectiveness in reaching its targets. Peter Boone
(1996) looked at how three different types of government/economic systems (egalitarian, elitist,
and laissez-faire) used foreign aid. He measured non-military aid flows to 96 countries, and
found that elitist political regimes best predict how aid will be spent. He also found no
significant correlation between aid and growth 39 and that aid did not benefit the poor but only
increased the size of government (the size of government has been shown to inhibit growth and
increase the opportunities for corruption). 40
Burnside and Dollar (2000) asked the research questions: is the effect of aid on growth
conditional on economic policies, and do donor governments allocate more aid to countries with
good policies? This study measured a country’s policy environment based on an index of budget
surplus, inflation rate and openness; and measured the effectiveness of aid by how much of it
was invested as opposed to spent outright. 41 To address allocation issues, they controlled for
population and variables that reflect donors’ strategic interests, and found no tendency to allocate
more aid to countries with good policies. They found that in countries with good policies,

38

Knack (2001), p.312
Boone (1996), p.10
40
Boone (1996),
41
Burnside and Dollar (2000), p. 847
39
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substantial amounts of aid contribute greatly to economic growth. However, they also found that
in countries with poor policies, foreign aid had no positive effects on growth. The increase in aid
tends to result in an increase in government consumption (not reinvestment), and government
consumption has no positive effect on growth. Burnside and Dollar suggested that if a
government with a bad policy environment receives aid, that aid does not lead to improvements
in economic policy because the government lacks the incentive to reform – it already has the
money from aid, so the motivations to improve its appearance to investors are less intense. 42
In two studies, Stephen Knack (2001 and 2004) studied the effects of aid on the quality of
governance in recipients. In a cross-country analysis (of 80 countries), he found that higher
levels of aid erode the quality of governance, as measured by an index of bureaucratic quality,
corruption and the rule of law. 43 He used the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as a
measure of quality of governance. To measure aid amount and dependency, the ODA as a
percentage of GNP and as a percentage of government expenditures were used. 44 In order to
account for other possible influences on governance, Knack controlled for per capita income (as
they could lead to improvements in governance by increasing tax revenue), religious or legal
traditions and colonial heritage. He found that the correlation between aid and governance was
negative – thus, showing that high levels of aid erode the quality of governance. Of the
governance quality index, corruption was the one least affected by aid. He suggested that
governments supported by an influx of aid are more likely to maintain poor governance.
Knack’s second paper “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” (2004) was a

42

Burnside and Dollar (2000), p.848
Knack (2001), p.310
44
Knack, p.314
43

15

multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization. 45 He used a large sample of
recipient countries over the 1975-2000 period. He used a Freedom House democracy index and
the Polity index to measure democracy (and government institutions), and ODA as a percentage
of GNP and government expenditures as measures of foreign aid. 46 The results of the
multivariate tests showed an insignificant correlation between aid and the Freedom House index
– concluding that aid (on average) has been ineffectual in promoting democracy.47 Despite this
study’s focus on democratization, it is a significant indicator for the relationship between aid and
corruption because it looks at aid effectiveness in reforming poor governance. This study found
that foreign aid does not have the impact on reform that donors often claim.
Research done on the relationship between corruption and foreign aid has been less
abundant than that on aid effectiveness, but it generally points to similar results. In one of the
first quantitative studies done on foreign aid and corruption, Lane and Tornell (1996) argued that
foreign aid encourages corrupt behavior in government. They suggest that this is due to
competing political factions, whose competition over the resources foreign aid provides leads to
more corrupted behaviors. In one of the first statistical studies focused on corruption and foreign
aid, Alesina and Weder(1999) asked whether foreign aid reduces or fosters corruption and
whether less corrupt governments receive more aid. Their corruption indicators were derived
from ICRG, the 1997 World Development Report, Standard and Poors, Business International,
the World Competiveness Yearbook and Transparency International. They found these indices to
be highly correlated, thus giving credibility to measures of corruption. 48 They also used the
following controls to control for other determinants for the allocation of foreign aid: level of
45

Knack (2004), p.251
Ibid, p.255
47
Ibid, p. 257
48
Alesina and Weder, p.10
46
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income in recipients, population size, economic policies, political systems and historical/political
links with donors. They used the OECD’s measurement of ODA for the foreign aid source, and
had three measures of foreign assistance: aid as a share of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), aid
per capita, and aid over government spending.
Alesina and Weder found that donors are often not all that selective concerning
recipients’ policy environments. Instead of highly corrupt governments receiving less foreign
aid, Alesina and Weder found that they actually receive more. 49 They also found that not all
donors lend or give in the same way: on average, Scandinavian countries gave to less corrupt
countries, while the U.S. gave more to corrupt countries; multilateral lending agencies
(international agencies like the World Bank) basically paid no attention to the level of corruption
in receiving countries; and private flows (the largest source from foreign investment) paid the
most attention to corruption. 50 Their findings on the relationship between aid and corruption
were less defined: they did not find signs that an increase in aid led to a decrease in corruption. 51
In keeping with previous studies, Jakob Svensson (2000) sought to find if there was a
relationship between widespread corruption and foreign aid. He used a game-theoretic rentseeking model to assess whether foreign aid leads to an increase in rent seeking. 52 His study
included 66 aid recipient countries, and his time period began in 1980 and was divided into three
5-year periods. 53 He used an index of corruption drawn from ICRG, and aid data from the World
Bank (he used grants instead of ODA). Other variables include ethno-linguistic heterogeneity,
arms imports, infant mortality, democracy, and trade as a share of GDP. He found that instead of
49
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foreign aid being an inducement for reform, it actually encourages higher levels of rent-seeking.
Svensson was surprised to find occurrences when an influx of aid into a government actually led
to a decrease in public provisions. 54 As he writes, “the larger the government budget, the larger
the incentives to deviate.” 55 Alesina and Weder also addressed this occurrence, and explain the
decrease in public resources in the following way: “One manifestation of corruption may be a
high tax evasion…[due to] a large black economy …or unwillingness of the government to
collect revenues.” 56 Thus, a government’s reliance on foreign aid as income can also discourage
them from enacting stronger anti-corruption measures outside of the government as well as
inside the government. Svensson also studied the effects of ethnic diversity on foreign aid and
corruption, and found that ethnic heterogeneity is significant in increasing the level of corruption
when foreign aid is introduced. 57
Ethnic competition is a major explanatory factor for corruption in Svensson’s study. It
explains how the increase of government revenue can lead to a decrease in public provisions and
how the mere expectation of aid can increase corruption (as competing groups scramble for
claims on the expected aid). 58 His findings connect to the above studies by supporting the idea
that aid does not encourage reform in a bad policy environment. In this case, a bad policy and
governance environment is one in which competing social groups are enabled by a lack of strict
rules and democratic regulation, guarding against competing for resources by corrupt measures.
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The Alternative
Despite the consensus among empirical studies pointing to inefficiencies of aid to
improve bad situations in governance and economic policy, the reality is that donors are being
asked to increase their aid, not decrease it. The leading economist Jeffery Sachs is a major
proponent for increasing foreign aid (albeit with improvements), as are most charities and even
international institutions (like the World Bank) are not shrinking from increasing their aid. In its
2005 Global Monitoring Report, the World Bank reported that foreign aid should be doubled. 59
Charity organizations like Oxfam International have frequently called for an increase in foreign
aid. In their 2005 press release, they list the following ways that aid can be used as a weapon to
fight corruption: it can build the capacity of governments to monitor the spending of aid and help
them pay civil servants a livable wage (bureaucratic corruption being one of the most common
and detrimental forms of corruption in the developing world), it can fight the poverty that creates
endemic corruption in the first place, it can help spread democracy through the developing
world, and donor countries can be more responsible in their lending by making sure “that aid is
well-targeted, well-managed and transparently given on a needs-led basis. The G8 must ….stop
giving aid solely as a reward for countries opening up their markets, pursuing free-market
policies or joining the fight against terrorism.” 60
While much less abundant, there have also been empirical studies showing foreign aid in
a more favorable light in relation to corruption. In his paper “Does Foreign Aid Corrupt”, Jose
Tavares estimated the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural
distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality. He used the ICRG
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indicator of corruption, and the OECD aid outflows to construct the instrumental variables. 61 By
instrumenting the aid variables with controls for GDP/capita, political rights, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, oil exporter, total population, public expenditures/GDP, and whether the
country is a former colony, Tavares found that an increase in aid inflows of 1% GDP leads to a
decrease in corruption of -.2 points (out of the possible range of 10). 62
In agreement with Alesina and Weder’s finding that more corrupt countries receive more
aid, Tavares concluded that the fact that less corrupt countries receive less aid biases previous
findings. He claimed that the previous studies have not accounted for reverse causation and often
have not instrumented their aid variable. 63 Tavares concluded that “we should interpret our
results as pointing to the potentially beneficial impact of aid inflows on corruption once current
biases in aid allocation are weeded out.” 64 Tavares’ study is one of the only studies with
empirical evidence pointing to foreign aid as an inhibitor to corruption.

Beyond Academia
Burnside and Dollar’s finding that the policy environment of a country will determine
whether or not aid is effective has become a very popular argument. On their “Aid Effectiveness
Research” website, the World Bank describes good policy environments as having, “stable
macroeconomic environments, open trade regimes and protected property rights as well as
efficient public bureaucracies that can deliver education, health and other public services. When
developing countries have this kind of sound management, financial aid has a big effect on
growth and poverty reduction, improving social indicators over and above what good
61
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management itself induces.” 65 In effect, the World Bank states that more money should go to
countries with better management.
However, we know from Alesina and Weder’s findings that more money goes to
countries with higher levels of corruption (and thus countries with poor governance and policy
environments). The World Bank looks at this as the major problem: “The actual allocation of aid
has often been influenced by the strategic interests of donors.” 66 They blame bilateral aid
(between two governments) as being biased towards former colonies, political allies and
strategies instead of focusing on policy environments. 67 The World Bank website suggests that a
good way to promote reform through aid is to make financing conditional on the adoption of
certain policies, and to improve the way these conditions are enforced. In keeping with Boone’s
claims that conditioning aid does not work, the World Bank confesses that about a third of the
World Bank’s adjustment loans failed to meet their objectives. 68 However, they attribute this to
the policy environment, and not to the act of conditioning loans.
In 2004, the United States Government formed the Millennium Challenge Corporation
based on the belief that the policy environment in a country determines the effectiveness of aid.
Judging from 17 different indicators (one of them being corruption), the MCC grants loans or
donates money based on how a country rates on those indicators. The MCC is an example of
how influential the “policy environment” argument has been in affecting donor responsibility.
The amount of foreign aid being transferred from donors to the developing world is
growing. The contributions pledged in 2007 by the 45 nations who make up the World Bank
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International Development Association (IDA) increased by 42% since 2005. 69 The argument that
foreign aid is not effective is simply not being heeded by donors. The argument that the policy
environment is crucial, however, is being listened to. The consensus is that foreign aid given to a
country with a poor policy environment (high corruption being an aspect of that) is not only
wasted, but is actually fueling that bad policy environment. Thus, it is generally agreed that
foreign aid fuels corruption when corruption is highly present.
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
Methodology
While most of the research studying foreign aid and corruption has focused on the
developing world at large, or been country-specific, this paper focuses on a region; specifically,
on 14 Sub-Saharan African countries and their particular situations with corruption and foreign
aid over nine years (1998-2006). These 14 countries have been chosen because they are the only
African countries that are listed on Transparency International’s CPI (Corruption Perceptions
Index) consistently over the time period which was studied. Transparency International began
publishing their CPI statistics in 1996; because of the slow-changing nature of corruption, a
study of a longer time period is needed to show real change. However, Transparency
International had limited access to Sub-Saharan African countries in the earlier years, and 1998
is the year in which it introduced all of the chosen countries - which are all still listed on the CPI
in 2007. While the CPI is available up to 2007, the OECD (foreign aid statistics source) has not
yet released the ODA statistics past 2006 – therefore the study is limited in its foreign aid
information up to that year. Thus, the availability of the data has determined both the sample size
and the time period.

Quantitative Section
I will be using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in my thesis. For the
quantitative section, I will use multiple regression to measure the strength and direction of the
relationship between the independent (foreign aid) and dependent (corruption) variables. I have
chosen multiple regression because it allows me to incorporate controls into my study of the
relationship between foreign aid and perceptions of corruption.
23

According to the empirical consensus, foreign aid perpetuates poor governance and bad
policies (with corruption being a symptom of both) in countries with these problems. As such, it
is presumed that foreign aid given to countries with high levels of corruption will fuel that
corruption, and over a period of time we will see an increase in the levels of corruption.
Therefore, I hypothesize that, if aid recipiency increases corruption in highly corrupt countries,
then such countries with rising aid levels should exhibit a declining CPI score (showing
increasing levels of perceptions of corruption) over time. Accordingly, the dependent variable
analyzed is the perception of corruption level (measured as the CPI). The independent variable is
the amount of foreign aid received (measured as ODA).
Control Variables

As previous research has shown, there are other influences on corruption that may skew
the accuracy of analysis focusing on the relationship between foreign aid and corruption. These
determinants include changes over the 1998-2006 time period in: GDP, political rights, total
population 70 , and government expenditures; as well as the deposits of energy natural resources
(oil, gas and coal) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization of each country. Controlling for GDP is
important because there is a shown negative association between corruption and GPD. 71
Political rights is a control because it is a direct indicator of good governance – which should
lead to corruption-defeating policies. 72 Government expenditure (public expenditures as a share
of GDP) is a control because it has been shown that the more governments are involved in the
economy, the more they are prone to pressures such as corruption. 73 Sachs and Warner (2001)
70
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showed that economies that have high exports of natural resources grow slower; they suggested
that this is due to higher government corruption. 74 Svensson showed that the more ethnolinguistic fractionalization a country has, the more it is prone to corruption when receiving
foreign aid because competing groups will scramble for aid resources to benefit their own
groups. 75

Qualitative Section
While the quantitative research will focus on a wider scope of countries, the qualitative
research will be a case study that focuses on one Sub-Saharan country which has seen a massive
increase in foreign aid (from 1998 to 2006) and which has also shown improvements in its
control over corruption: Nigeria.
I chose Nigeria because it is one of the largest ODA recipients in the world, it is located
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it has CPI ratings for every year in my time period. In 2006, the
OECD showed Nigeria to be the largest ODA recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa. More than any
other country in my sample, Nigeria saw a massive increase in its ODA from 1998 to 2006. 76 At
the same time, according to its annual CPI ratings, Nigeria has also reduced its perceived level of
corruption over the nine years studied. 77 It would seem that this occurrence goes against the
consensus.
Case studies are often used to test theories by applying the main tenets of the theory to
actual cases. In this paper, I will be applying this method to the theory that foreign aid intake
encourages corruption in countries with a poor policy and governance environments. This theory
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combines the findings covered in Chapter 2 that support the consensus: that foreign aid has little
positive effect on countries with bad policy environments (Burnside and Dollar), that foreign aid
supports bad governance environments and that higher levels of aid erode the quality of
governance (Knack), and that higher levels of aid encourage corruption and reduce productive
public spending (Svensson and Boone).

Sources
Quantitative Sources
Corruption has been notoriously difficult to measure. Andvig et al write that, “ideally, the
data applied in research on corruption should be based on direct and first-hand observations of
corrupt transactions made by unbiased observers who are familiar with the rules and routines in
the sector under scrutiny.” 78 However, the complexity of international transactions and various
development projects often take place in large hierarchies to which independent corruption
researchers probably do not have access. It is also difficult to measure corruption by recording
accounts of those within the country because of the “hidden nature of corruption”. Corruption is
often carried out in secret with no witnesses, and unlike many other crimes, corruption often has
no direct witnesses. In crimes like theft and assault, crime can be measured by victimization
surveys, but in corruption crimes, victims may not know about the corrupt act in detail. 79 Thus,
information about corruption has often been indirect, and that has led to many earlier studies on
corruption lacking a solid empirical basis. 80
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However, there has recently been an increase in accountability in corruption research. In
the mid-1990’s, Mauro’s article “Corruption and Growth” (1995) was highly influential in
bringing the study of corruption into the interest of the field of economic growth studies among
economists – and as a result the credibility of the empirical analysis of corruption has
increased. 81 While Mauro used Business International’s 1980 survey, Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has since taken precedence as the most “well
known and most used both in research and in the public debate.” 82
The increased use of statistics that rely on perceptions of corruption to measure
corruption has led some to question the validity of using perceptions of corruption as a valid
measurement of corruption – arguing that the opinions and perceptions of those surveyed result
in data that is subjective and vague. 83 However, due to the hidden nature of corruption,
perception based on the actual experiences of individuals is sometimes the best information
available. 84 The most reliable measures of perceptions of corruption are those that find the
widest spectrum of individuals - including members of the community (those who deal with
corruption as a part of their lives in the country) and those who must interact with the country for
economic and non-economic reasons (including foreign investors, charitable organizations, etc).
The idea that cultural beliefs may skew perceptions of what exactly constitutes corruption does
81
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not appear as substantial as once thought. According to several studies, perceptions of corruption
from cross-country surveys of domestic firms tend to be very highly correlated with perceptions
of corruption from expert ratings in commercial risk rating agencies or multilateral development
banks. 85
The CPI is one of the most credible, and accessible, corruption ratings available. It has
been supported by the advisement of the Index Advisory Committee since 1996 and, because of
that, it is based on the latest and most developed methodologies and measurement tools. Besides
the IAC, the national chapters in many of the developing countries also help to develop
surveying techniques and corruption measurement. 86 Transparency International derives the CPI
from expert assessments and opinion surveys from international sources as well as surveys
within the countries. 87 The 1998 CPI rated 85 countries, and the 2005 CPI rated 158. In 1998, the
CPI was based only on the perceptions of business people, but in 2005 the survey had grown to
include country experts, non-resident business leaders from developing countries, and resident
business leaders evaluating their own country.88
The CPI is a “poll of polls” – it combines information from several different polls to
figure out a country’s rating. The rating is based on the degree to which those surveyed believe a
country’s public officials and politicians are corrupt (in that they accept bribes, embezzle public
funds, etc.). In 1998, it was based on 7 different polls; in 2005, 16 surveys and expert
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assessments were consulted (for individual countries, this number varied – however a country
must have at least 3 sources in order to be listed on the CPI). 89 The CPI scale runs from 10 to 0,
from the perception of a country having the least corruption to having the most. A score of 10
shows that the country is perceived as having no corruption, and a score of 0 shows that a
country is perceived as being completely corrupt.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is my source for
the foreign aid statistics. I will be looking at the net official development assistance (ODA) over
the nine year period for each of the 14 countries. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made
on concessional terms and grants by official agencies of the member of DAC, by multilateral
institutions and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in the
recipient territories and countries. 90 It also includes debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid and
bilateral development projects. 91 The DAC (Development Assistance Committee) is comprised
of 23 member states – all of them developed countries – which are the major donor countries of
the world. Of course, recipient countries receive aid outside of ODA (the largest amount of that
being from private flows) but Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where ODA
flows still run higher than private flows. 92 In fact, despite the fall of ODA rates of 4.5% in 2006,
Sub-Saharan Africa saw an all-time high of $39.9 Billion in worldwide ODA inflows. 93
Therefore, ODA is the prominent source of foreign aid for this region.
The World Bank’s 2006 “At a Glance” papers cover all of this study’s countries, and is
the source for GDP, government expenditures as a share of GDP, exports as a share of GDP, and
89
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the population control variables. The political rights variable is taken from the Freedom House
political rights rating, and the ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable is from the ELF (Ethno
Linguistic Fractionalization) Index from the World Factbook, 2003. While most of the variables
are averages, the population variable is directly from 2006. The GDP variable is an average of
the 1996 and 2006 amounts in USD Billions. The exports and government expenditures variables
are averages of the same time period, and are in percentages (as a share of GDP). The political
rights average is taken from 1996-2006, and the ethnolinguistic variable is an average of the ELF
rating from the 1960s to 1980s. 94

Qualitative Sources
The statistical sources for the qualitative research will be as follows: Transparency
International’s CPI for corruption levels, the OECD’s ODA for aid recipiency, the Freedom
House’s rating for quality of governance, and the OECD’s Nigeria Country Study paper to study
both the policy environment and government spending trends. The other sources range from
newspaper articles to in-depth studies of Nigeria’s economic and governance policies. In 1998,
Nigeria was one of the most corrupt countries listed on the CPI 95 . This perceived high level of
corruption was a major indicator of its bad policy environment. As was common, this did not
stop the flow of ODA to this country – in fact Nigeria saw a massive increase of ODA over the
nine year period. If the theoretical consensus is correct, then my research will show that
Nigeria’s policy and governance environments have not improved, but have actually gotten
worse. Hence, Nigeria’s corruption perception level should have stayed the same, or increased in
severity over the nine year period as foreign aid was increased.
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Expectations
It has become popular to question foreign aid’s effectiveness in encouraging positive
change in the developing world. The idea that foreign aid has no positive effect on countries with
poor policies and governance has been widely accepted as fact. So, why bother dedicating
another body of research to this seemingly closed case? Many believe that this case is not closed
and cite instances of foreign aid of not only lifting people out of poverty, but also pushing
governments to reform bad policies. The aim of this paper is to apply the consensus of foreign
aid’s inefficiency in corrupt countries to Sub-Saharan Africa. If the theory proves correct in this
instance, then the results will show a positive relationship between foreign aid and corruption;
and if there is a negative relationship between the two then we see that the consensus needs
further refining and questioning. Applying the theory to an in-depth study of Nigeria is valuable
because it tests the theory on an individual basis. Statistical analysis assesses averages, and
looking at one case alone gives us another perspective. If the consensus theory is correct, then we
can expect to see Nigeria having higher levels of perceived corruption (because of their increase
in aid) over the time period.
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CHAPTER 4 – QUANTITATIVE SECTION
Introduction
This chapter shows the results of statistically testing the hypothesis that there is a positive
relationship between foreign aid and perceptions of corruption. First, I will report trends in
perceived corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period of nine years. Then, I will report the
simple bivariate correlations using Pearson’s r correlation coefficients and significance levels to
show the degree and strength of the linear relationship between two variables. Table 1 reports
Pearson’s r and significance levels in one-tailed tests among all variables. Table 2 shows a
summary of correlations between each independent variable and corruption. Figure 1 is a
scatterplot graph visually showing the direction of the relationship between foreign aid and
perceptions of corruption. Figure 2 shows the variation in CPI ratings for each of the 14
countries, and Figure 3 shows the ODA variance. Using logistical regression analysis and
controlling for other variables which have been shown to affect corruption, I next present
estimates of the association between foreign aid, GDP, population, government
expenditures/GDP, exports/ GDP, political rights and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. I also
present regression equations illustrating the impact of foreign aid on corruption.

Corruption Trends
Figure 2 shows the CPI trends of the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries included in the
study from 1998 to 2006. As with most countries included in the Transparency International CPI
index, Sub-Saharan African countries have not seen dramatic change in perceived political
corruption over the nine year period. For the most part, countries have not fluctuated more than
one point, and within the nine year period a country’s CPI often fluctuated both positively and
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negatively from year to year. However small the change, there still is variance within most
countries from year to year; this shows that most SSA countries do experience change in their
corruption perception levels, often from year to year. A number of factors could be highly
influential in this change, and some are discussed below.

Bivariate Analysis
Look to Table 1 for the correlation table. The following bivariate correlations reflect the
1998-2006 average corruption levels and all other variables to show the influence that GDP,
population, government control over the economy, natural resources, political rights, and
ethnolinguistic fractionalization may have on perceptions of corruption. This is based on
Pearson’s r correlations and significance levels. Not all of the independent variables proposed in
the last chapter are significantly correlated with perceptions of corruption, and that leads to
conclusions that question this study’s core hypothesis.

GDP
Economic development is largely seen to be influential on corruption. The theory is that
the more developed a country is, the less likely it is to have high levels of corruption. The
correlation here is .222, which does show a positive relationship (as GDP increased, the CPI
increased – showing a perception of less corruption), but it is not statistically significant in this
situation. This may be due to the fact that this study only included Sub-Saharan African
countries, where most of the countries are underdeveloped and have relatively low annual GDP
amounts. In studies that include a sample with more diversity in GDP, the results would most
likely be different.

33

Population
Population size is included as a control because it has been shown that large countries are
over-sampled in corruption indices - because of their attraction to foreign investors. This action
creates a sample bias in the indices used by this corruption measurement source. 96 The
population variable is the 1996 population of each country. The correlation coefficient here is .402. This means that as the population size increased, the CPI decreased (meaning that
corruption increased). Therefore, the idea that corruption is more likely to be perceived as high
in countries with large populations (because investors are more likely to deal with those
countries) is evidenced in this correlation. However, the coefficient is insignificant, and this may
be so because the sample was confined to the Sub-Saharan region.

Government Expenditure/GDP
It has been shown that the extent to which a government has control over the economy is
influential on that country’s political corruption. 97 In some cases, government consumption has
also been shown to have no positive effect on growth 98 , as well as lowering the provision of
public goods. 99 Therefore, it is hypothesized that the larger the government expenditure (a
measurement of the public sector’s control relative to the private sector) as a share of GDP, the
higher the corruption levels. Hence, the coefficient should show that a rise in government
expenditure will equal a fall in CPI. The correlation coefficient for this study is -.036, which
shows the hypothesized negative relationship, but is statistically insignificant. Therefore,
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government expenditures as a share of GDP have little very effect on perceived corruption in this
situation.

Natural Resources
A measure of natural resources are included because studies have shown that natural
resource rich countries tend to grow more slowly, and one reason is attributed to higher levels of
corruption. 100 While Sachs and Warner primarily focused on countries with oil as a natural
resource, I have included oil, gas and coal in this study’s natural resource variable (energy).
Energy is a dummy variable, coded 1 for countries with deposits of oil, gas or coal, and 0 for
those without. I hypothesize that countries with oil, gas or coal as natural resources will be more
likely to have lower CPI ratings (and thus higher levels of perceived corruption), so the
relationship should be negative. The coefficient is .065, and is not significantly related to a
country’s political corruption in this study.

Political Rights
The political rights statistic was taken from the 1998-2006 average of each country’s
Freedom House rating, which is based on their annual Freedom in the World survey. The survey
measures freedom according to two categories: political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House
defines political rights as “rights that enable people to participate freely in the political process,
including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a
decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate”, and civil liberties as
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“allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of
law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.” 101
The Freedom House rating for political rights runs on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 indicating the
highest level of freedom and 7 indicating the lowest level of freedom. The CPI is a scale of 0 to
10, with 0 indicating the most corruption and 10 indicating the least. As a country rises on the
Freedom House rating (thus showing less political rights), it should fall on the CPI scale. Thus,
the relationship between the political rights variable and the corruption variable should be
negative, according to the widely-held belief that political freedoms coincide with less
corruption. The correlation coefficient for this study is -.817 (significant at the .01 level),
showing a highly significant, negative relationship between perceptions of corruption and
political rights. As the Freedom House rating rises (showing a decline in political rights), the CPI
drops (showing a rise in perceptions of corruption).

Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization
Fractionalization between social groups has been shown to lead to higher rates of
corruption in most situations. The idea behind this is that highly fractionalized countries are
more prone to political instability and corruption because the social groups compete for
resources. The ELF index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization runs on a scale of 0 to 1, with a
score of 0 being the least fractionalized and 1 being the most fractionalized. Therefore, a
negative relationship should occur between the CPI rating and the ELF rating. A country with a
lower ELF will be less fractionalized, thus it will have a higher CPI rating (showing less
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perceived corruption). The correlation coefficient in this study is -.604 (significant at the .05
level). This shows a significant, negative relationship.

Foreign Aid
The major hypothesis in this study proposes that the relationship between the corruption
and foreign aid variables is strongly negative. Therefore, as the ODA levels rise, the CPI score
should fall. This relationship is reflected in the correlation coefficient, which is -.625 (significant
at the .05 level). According to this correlation, Sub-Saharan African countries with higher levels
of ODA are more likely to have lower CPI scores.

Summary
The above bivariate correlations result in varied conclusions for this study. Previous work
done on corruption and its contributors have shown that political corruption is influenced by a
number of factors, and this study focused on how those factors influenced perceptions of
corruption specifically in Sub-Saharan African countries. Given that many statistical studies on
corruption have taken samples from various regions around the world instead of one (as this
study does), the above factors have often had more of an impact in statistical tests because of the
diversity between regions. GDP, population size and government expenditures correlations were
insignificant in this study. Again, their insignificance may have more to do with regional
similarity working as a control with these factors.
Perceptions of political corruption did prove to be heavily influenced by political rights,
ethno-linguistic fractionalization and foreign aid levels. The political rights variable proved to
have the strongest correlation with the corruption variable. According to this study, the more a
government improves in providing political rights, the less it is perceived to be corrupt.
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However, correlations do not address causality. Perceptions that corruption was improving
probably closely parallel improvements in political rights, with both changes occurring because
of government reforms. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization was also strongly related to
perceptions of corruption. As previous research has shown, competition for resources between
ethnic groups in government can often create high degrees of corruption. This was evident in the
correlation test. Foreign aid was not the most strongly related to perceptions of corruption, but it
did prove to have a significantly negative relationship with perceptions of corruption. As
hypothesized, countries receiving the most amounts of foreign aid were also the most likely to
have more perceived corruption. From the bivariate correlations, the conclusion can be made that
countries with less political rights, more ethno-linguistic fractionalization and higher intakes of
foreign aid are more likely to be perceived as having high levels of political corruption.

Multivariate Analysis
Introducing control variables that have been shown to be influential on the dependent
variable in previous studies is important to assess a more accurate estimate of the relationship
specific to the independent variable and dependent variable focused on in a theory. Therefore, I
conducted two multiple regression tests to clarify and validate the proposed relationship between
foreign aid and corruption. The first model regresses the below variables on the corruption
variable (that averages the CPI ratings over nine years). 102 The second model regresses the 2002
variables on the 2003 corruption variable to study the effects of the variables on perceptions of
corruption over a year. I provide the model equations, tables and results for each of these models
below.
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Regression Models and Results
For the first model, the foreign aid variable tested was an average of each country’s ODA
recipiency over the nine year period. The corruption variable tested was an average of each
country’s 1998-2006 CPI ratings. The control variables were either averages or data from a
specific year during the period (all of this information is discussed previously in the chapter). I
discuss the results and provide tables of regression estimates for the model in this section.

Model 1 - Foreign Aid and Corruption Over Time
Model for Regression of Foreign Aid and controls on Perceptions of Corruption from 1998 to
2006
Corravg = Bo + ODAavg +Pop96 + EthnicFracavg + Energydum + GDPavg + PolRightavg +
GovtExpendavg
The results for the first model are shown on Table 3. When (1998-2006) average ODA,
1996 population, the ethno-linguistic fractionalization rating (ELF), deposits of oil, coal and/or
gas, average GDP, political rights rating average and government control over economy are
simultaneously regressed on average corruption perception levels, most of the variables lose their
significance. Foreign aid and political rights are the only variables that maintain significance
with a p-value of less than .05 when regressed on corruption. Of the two, a country’s political
rights are the most influential on corruption (with an unstandardized coefficient of -.478 and a pvalue of 0.00). This shows that countries with higher political rights ratings (which indicate a
poorer political-rights environment) have lower CPI ratings. Intake of ODA did hold significance
with corruption perception, with an unstandardized coefficient of -.001 and a p-value of .017.
The model’s standard error of estimate is .3316, with an adjusted R2 of .933, suggesting that only
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7% remains to be explained by other variables. The Model 1 regression test results in the
conclusion that within Sub-Saharan Africa, political rights have the most influence on
perceptions of corruption and foreign aid does have a negative impact on political corruption.
Thus, the theory that foreign aid may contribute to perceptions of corruption proves valid in this
case.

Model 2 – Foreign Aid and Corruption Over a One-year Period
In the second model, I narrow the time range of study to a specific year. In 2003, many of
the countries in this study saw declining CPI rating from the previous year. 103 Because this study
is concerned with influences on corruption, the independent variables have been lagged to values
from 2002. Table 4 shows the regression findings for model 2. The model’s equation is below.
Model for Regression of Foreign Aid and controls on Perceptions of Corruption over One Year
Corr03 = Bo + ODA02 +Pop02 + EthnicFracavg + Energydum + GDP02 + PolRight02 +
GovtExpend02
This model’s adjusted R2 is .833, suggesting that only 17% remains to be explained by
other variables (with a standard error of estimate of .5043). All of the variables that lost their
viability in the first regression test proved again to have no significance in this test. Foreign aid
also lost its significance, leaving political rights as the only variable with influence on
perceptions of corruption. This test shows that foreign aid may lose its influence on corruption in
Sub-Saharan Africa from year to year. This finding means that foreign aid may be ineffective in
controlling corruption as it is, and that foreign aid may only affect corruption over a more
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40

expansive period of time. The fact that the political rights climate seems to hold the most
influence on perceptions of corruption is consistent with the consensus that a country must have
a good governance environment, or be showing significant movement in that direction, before
corruption can be effectively dealt with.

Summary
In summary, both of the models point in a similar direction – that perceptions of
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is most influenced by the general state of political rights;
foreign aid has a slightly negative influence on corruption. The other variables that have proven
to be influential on perceptions of corruption have by and large proven insignificant in this study,
but one may safely assume that to be attributed to regional similarities. Overall, the important
information for this study’s test of the literary consensus (that foreign aid is only effective in
good policy/governance environments; and that, if given to countries with bad governance
environments, foreign aid can foster corruption instead of fight it) is pointing to the support of
that theory.
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CHAPTER 5 - NIGERIA
This chapter analyzes the findings of the theoretical consensus on foreign aid and
corruption as they apply to Nigeria. The first section will review the theoretical consensus. The
second section will describe Nigeria’s governance and economic policy environments, as well as
Nigeria’s relationship with foreign aid during 1998-2007. Finally, the third section will draw
conclusions on the accuracy of the consensus in regards to the effects of foreign aid’s ability to
fight corruption in Nigeria. The central question of this section is: Have increases in foreign aid
paralleled positive changes in Nigeria’s governance and economic policy environments, and thus
in its levels of corruption?

Theoretical Consensus
Many studies have found foreign aid to be ineffective in promoting economic growth and
democracy, and have frequently pointed to foreign aid’s enabling effects on detrimental factors
such as corruption. Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that foreign aid given to countries with bad
policy environments (thus high corruption) does not improve growth, and can actually fuel
corruption. 104 Svensson (2000) found that foreign aid does not help growth when given to
governments that spend the aid on large government expenditures, and little on re-investment. 105
He also found that countries with higher ethno-linguistic fractionalization were more likely to
see foreign aid coincide with higher levels of corruption. Knack (2001) found that aid may
actually undermine the quality of governance and its institutions by encouraging rent-seeking
and corruption (by encouraging conflict over control of aid funds, discouraging real talent in the
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bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures on government by the public and investors to reform). 106
In a later study, Knack (2004) also found that aid does not promote democracy. This research has
often led those policy makers opposing increases in foreign aid to argue that foreign aid given to
corrupt countries is largely wasted and ineffective in promoting growth. 107

Nigeria’s Policy Environment
Nigeria’s Governance Environment 1998-2006
Stephen Knack stated that “good governance – in the form of institutions that establish a
predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced set of rules for investors – is crucial for the
sustained and rapid growth in per capita incomes of poor countries.” 108 In his article studying the
effects of aid dependence and governance, Knack measured good governance by an index of
bureaucratic quality, corruption and the rule of law. According to the UNESCAP website,
governance is “the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are
implemented.” 109 Good governance has the following characteristics: “It is participatory,
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and
inclusive and follows the rule of law.” 110 This section will look at Nigeria’s governance quality
during the Obasanjo administration (1999 – 2007), focusing on the following: institutional
quality, quality of electoral/political process, severity of corruption, and quality of life for
Nigerians. Because of the drastic effect of the Abacha regime (the preceding government to
Obasanjo’s regime) on the Nigerian government, an introductory section will briefly describe the
Abacha and Abubakar governance environments as well.
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From Abacha to Abubakar (1993 – 1999)

Nigeria experienced its darkest period under General Sani Abacha. When General
Abacha assumed power in 1993, his hostile takeover caused many to demand a return to civilian
rule. Due to the widespread strikes and protests in response to his takeover, Abacha declared a
state of emergency – under which he banned political activity and representative government. 111
Only personal appointments of proven Abacha-supporters were given positions of power, and
this greatly impeded any checks on his power.
In August of 1994, Abacha’s security forces arrested political opponents, closed down
media offices and cracked down on any dissent to his regime. 112 In early 1995, Abacha’s regime
and the Provisional Ruling Council (a military governing body created under Abacha) arrested
40 military officers and civilians and tried them in secret military tribunals for attempting a coup
and “anti-regime activities” (prominent politicians like the former ruler (of the 1970s) Olusegun
Obasanjo were included in this group, as were some human rights activists, journalists, and
relatives of the coup members). 113 Many were convicted and imprisoned, and death sentences
were given to a few.
Finally, in response to national and international protests to his government, Abacha
called for elections for a Constitutional Congress in 1994. However, most Nigerians boycotted
the elections in protest to the government. In 1997, he set a timetable for civilian elections for
1998 and declared that Nigeria was in a transition to civilian rule. Once again, these promises
were insincere, evidenced when he banned all but 5 political parties – all of which committed

111

http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria-POLITICS-GOVERNMENT-ANDTAXATION.html

112
113

Ibid
Ibid

44

their support of Abacha as their presidential candidate in the upcoming elections – and continued
to arrest members of the democratic organization NADECO and to hold political opponents in
prison. 114
Because of the economic policies of the Abacha’s administration, the people of Nigeria
suffered greatly during his regime. Petroleum prices rose dramatically – and, in effect, so did the
prices of goods and services rose – while wages froze. As a result, communication between
civilians and government was often hostile. The economic hardships, combined with political
injustices, led to frequent strikes by labor unions and government employees. Abacha’s regime
responded with violence, imprisonment and exile. Administration strike forces carried out
assassinations, quieted possible political opponents by threatening their families, and even set off
bombs in several major cities. 115 The electoral and political processes were those of a brutal
military dictatorship.
The severity of political corruption in Nigeria peaked under Abacha. The Chief
Economic Advisor to the President (Philip Asiodu) under Abacha later admitted that over £5.5
billion were stolen by the administration from the national treasury under Abacha, with 2.2
billion of that stolen by Abacha personally (and his family). 116 Soon after coming to power,
Abacha centralized control over the government’s economic policy, exemplified in his
requirement that the federal bank (Central Bank of Nigeria) answer directly to him. 117 He
eliminated opponents in the financial sector of the government, just as he did in the other sectors.
Hence, there simply was no check on his power to allocate money.
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There was great opportunity for personal enrichment through alliance with Abacha, and
no fiscal restraints existed among those close to his regime. The Office of the First Lady under
Maryam Abacha was involved in many projects which had exorbitant price tags. An example of
this was the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) conducted by the Office of the First
Lady; under which there were many subsequent accusations that the contracts for the purchase of
the vaccines were substantially inflated. 118 Military leaders, bureaucrats and others involved in
the expansive military government accumulated land and wealth beyond their official paychecks.
119

Billions of dollars were misappropriated for projects that were never completed, while

government social services suffered because Abacha’s centralized control over government
revenue starved the local and state governments of funding. 120 This resulted in poor institutional
quality throughout the government.
Abacha died under mysterious circumstances before the 1998 elections, and left Nigeria
in a governance crisis. When General Abubakar was selected to replace the notorious Abacha, he
faced the remnants of a repressive and corrupt dictatorship. He immediately set about reversing
many of the previous regime’s actions. He released political prisoners, raised civil servant wages,
terminated wasteful and irrelevant institutions, and cancelled elections that were corrupted by the
Abacha regime - promising new elections (and a turnover to civilian rule) in one year. 121 Unlike
previous leaders – with their excuses and delays, Abubakar did indeed allow elections in 1999,
and handed over power to a civilian government headed by the former leader Ogluson Obasanjo.
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Although brief, Abubakar’s leadership of the country is important because it was during this time
that transition from military dictatorship to civilian democracy began. The governing institutions
began to be rebuilt, and Abubakar’s loosening of military control on the government was crucial
for peaceful transition.
The Obasanjo Years (1999-2007)

Obasanjo’s election in May of 1999 marked the beginning of civilian rule, and the end of
16 years of repressive military rule. Obasanjo’s two terms as president of Nigeria allowed him to
have much influence over the country, and his presidency is the most important for this study.
This section will look at the governance environment created by Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007.
With Obasanjo came a new constitution and government structure. The constitution
created a bicameral legislature: the National Assembly, with a 360-member House of
Representatives and a 109-member Senate. The executive branch and the office of president
retained strong federal powers. The judiciary and legislative branches were strengthened after
suffering through the Abacha regime’s neglect. 122
In a 2006 speech, Obasanjo outlined the importance of good governance: “Good
governance remains…the most critical ingredient for eliminating poverty, instability, violence
and underdevelopment. With good governance, you can be assured of accountability, respect for
the rule of law and human rights, transparency, sensitivity to the plight of the disadvantaged and
the deepening and consolidation of democracy.” 123 While this speech enthusiastically supported
good governance reform in Nigeria, many have pointed out how ineffective Obasanjo’s time in
office was in strengthening truly democratic institutions. In 2002 (towards the end of Obasanjo’s
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first term), Rotini Suberu (a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and
former senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) said that “Nigeria is in a state of broad
institutional ruination." 124
Obasanjo’s government also faced the preceding military government’s structural
problems: financial resources too concentrated in the federal government – with state and local
governments starved for resources and political/fiscal autonomy, 125 extreme budgetary problems,
an undeveloped election system, and ethnic/regional tensions caused by the federal/state
dynamic. The new constitution continued the federal government structure, but the balance of
power between federal and state/local governments remained imperfect even after Obasanjo left
office.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to good governance was the election process, because it
lacked a valid representation system. While the 2003 and 2007 elections were precedent-setting
in that they passed control from civilian government to civilian government through elections,
citations of these elections being rigged, violent and biased are not few and far between. 126
Therefore, it is hard to say that this aspect of good governance (consensus-driven and
representative) was truly reformed under the Obasanjo administration.
Obasanjo’s campaign against corruption did show some success, and many believe that
this was his major contribution to strengthening good governance in Nigeria. The creation of the
EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) in 2003 signaled the first time government
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officials would be held accountable for their corrupt behavior. 127 The commission actually
convicted high level officials for corruption under Obasanjo, and 31 out of Nigeria’s 36 state
governors were investigated for corruption by 2006. 128 Still, even this success has not been
completely without criticism. Some have accused the commission of targeting political enemies
of Obasanjo and PDP (People’s Democratic Party) opposition. 129 Others have criticized the lack
of progress in tackling corruption at the state level – where half of public expenditures take
place. 130
When determining the quality of governance under the Obasanjo regime, we must look at
four key aspects of governance: institutional quality, quality of electoral/political process,
severity of corruption, and quality of life for the population. This final section looks to several
statistics and articles covering the developments made in these areas from 1998 to 2006 to
further consider the success of the Obasanjo governance reforms.
The Human Development Index measures quality of life in many countries. The HDI
measures three elements of human development: life expectancy, education (% of population
attending primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment and adult literacy), and standard of
living (measured in Purchasing Power Parity income). Nigeria did improve its HDI rating over
this period, though it stayed solidly in the low-development bracket. In 1999, Nigeria had a score
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of .439 (making it 151st of 175 countries), in 2001 the score improved to .445, and in 2005 the
score improved again to .470. 131
While Nigeria’s HDI somewhat improved, high unemployment rates plagued the
Obasanjo administration for its duration. In 2004, the Nigerian National Planning Commission
stated that unemployment rates were down from 20% in 1999 to 10.8% in 2003. 132 However,
other accounts have shown actual unemployment rates to be as high as 28% in 2003. 133 The
OECD reported that the unemployment rate was down to 5.3% in 2006. The OECD paper points
out that an aggregate unemployment rate can be misleading, because it masks variations between
different age groups, as well as the variation from region to region. In 2006, youth
unemployment was 14%, and unemployment in the Southern region was nearly 24%. 134 Because
of the variance in statistics from source to source, it is difficult to tell if unemployment improved
during the Obasanjo regime.
Due to the lack of resources devoted to the states – where most of the public services
were funded – during the Abacha regime, public services (such as healthcare, education and
transportation) were in very poor condition when Obasanjo took office. Obasanjo’s first term
(1999-2003) showed little improvement in public services for Nigerians. In 2003, the OECD
reported that “the government places particular emphasis on health and education, where
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outcomes have not improved significantly despite large expenditures.” 135 While this period was
marked by the rehabilitation of the education system, the results were mixed: the 2007 HDR
reported that adult illiteracy was up from 62% in 1999 to 69% in 2005 136 , while education for
females had shown very little improvement in a decade, with primary school enrollment at less
than 50% in 2003. The quality of healthcare also remained inefficient, exemplified in the high
infant mortality rates (77 out of 1,000 infants died in 2005). 137
Obasanjo’s second term showed more success with public service reform. Major new
projects like the NEEDS (Nigerian Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) and
SEEDS (State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) – created in 2003 - were
aimed at improving the quality of life for Nigerians. By 2006, Nigeria had made improvements
in poverty by reducing the proportion of people living below the poverty line to 54.4% (down
from 70% in 2000). 138 In 2006, a government-conducted survey showed that 55% of the
population had access to medical services. 139 The Universal Basic Education (UBE), which
aimed at providing free primary and secondary education, resulted in a 120% total gross
primary-school enrollment rate in 2005 (up from 98% in 2000). 140
Overall, the Obasanjo administration enacted many governance reforms from 1999 to
2007. While some were more successful than others, and Nigeria was still in need of major
improvements, it can be said that the government was reform-minded; this is a crucial element in
previous studies on foreign aid effectiveness.
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Nigeria’s Economic Policy Environment 1999-2007
A country’s economic policy environment has been shown to be necessary for foreign
aid’s effectiveness. A good economic policy environment is one that provides the institutions and
opportunities for growth and development. The World Bank group stated that a stable
macroeconomic environment and open trade regimes are necessary for long term growth. 141 In
their study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) created an index of economic policy environment
indicators: budget surplus, inflation rate, openness, and investment. A high budget deficit, high
inflation rates, high government control over the economy, a closed economy, low re-investment
into the economy by the government, and high unemployment rates are all qualities of a poor
economic environment. This section will look at Nigeria’s economic policy environment over
the eight years of Obasanjo’s regime.

The detrimental effects of high level political corruption on Nigeria’s economy were
incredible. Abacha’s regime managed to leave Nigeria with a deficit of 9% of GDP (up from
2.8% in 1990) 142 , unbridled waste and corruption, and a crumbling economic infrastructure. The
economy was in real trouble, and Obasanjo was faced with dealing with high inflation, suffering
agriculture and manufacturing sectors, high unemployment and underemployment, and the
petroleum industry’s crumbling infrastructure. At the start of his second presidential term (2003),
Obasanjo’s prized economic team (headed by Dr. Ngozi Iweala-Okonjo – formerly with the
World Bank) NEEDS program, which targeted the major economic problems for Nigeria during
Obasanjo’s presidency. Its goals were to: boost the GDP growth to 5% (from 3%), establish
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stable interest rates, reform the public services, reduce unemployment, manage the massive
foreign debt, privatize state managed operations, and deregulate the petroleum industry. 143

Obasanjo’s economic team saw success in its macroeconomic policy. GDP grew from
$46 billion in 2000 to $115.3 billion in 2006. Inflation as a share of GDP dropped from 38.2% in
2000 to 7.9% in 2006. 144 In 2003 the deficit was 3.5% of GDP, and by 2005 economic reforms
transformed this deficit into an 11% surplus. In Obasanjo’s last term, the foreign reserves
increased from $7.5 billion (2003) to $38 billion (2006). 145 In 2006, the U.S. Treasury forgave
$18 billion of Nigeria’s debt, as part of an international campaign to forgive debt to heavily
indebted countries. During the last years of Obasanjo’s regime, oil revenues soared to $223
billion in (over two and a half times what was earned from oil revenues during the previous eight
years.) 146

However, the persistently high levels of unemployment signaled a troubled economic
policy environment. According to the speculations of the National Association of Chambers of
Commerce in Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), unemployment in Nigeria was as
high as 70% in August 2003. 147 As much as 60% of northern college graduates were unable to
find employment – a trend that resulted in higher crime rates. 148 This trend was widespread
across all regions in Nigeria. Basic living conditions continued to be poor during Obasanjo’s
regime; high unemployment, rising petrol and food costs, scarcity of clean water, declining
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quality of public services, and electricity shortages all combined to make life more difficult for
most Nigerians. The oil production infrastructure also suffered during this period - especially
because of the violence in the Niger Delta region. Destruction to pipelines and refineries,
increases in petroleum theft, and kidnappings of foreign workers all impacted oil exports and
foreign investment. 149

The resulting economic policy environment of Obasanjo’s regime is one that showed
improvements in some aspects but continued insufficiencies in others. Macroeconomic policy
changes led to a higher GDP growth rate, increases in privatization, lower inflation, and lower
rates of corruption. High unemployment, declining quality of the agriculture and manufacturing
sectors (due to inadequate re-investment) and the suffering petroleum infrastructure (due to
violence) all served to hurt the economic policy environment. Since the Obasanjo regime enacted
reforms aimed at improving the economic policy environment, it is possible to say that, while
falling short of complete success, Nigeria’s economic policy environment did improve on the
previous regime’s policies.

Foreign Aid to Nigeria 1998-2006
Major foreign aid organizations (like the World Bank and OECD) were impressed with
the Obasanjo reforms. The OECD’s 2007 “Africa’s Economic Outlook” paper wrote that
“Nigeria continues to make progress on its far-reaching economic reform program, NEEDS, and
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)…..Progress has also been made in the
areas of financial-sector reform, debt management, foreign reserves accumulation, exchange rate
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stability and the fight against corruption.” 150 Nigeria’s 2006 CAE (Country Assistance
Evaluation), which looked at the success of Nigeria’s economic and governance reforms and the
World Bank’s assistance to Nigeria, cited that “a major increase in Bank support accompanied
the restoration of democracy and improved economic development.” 151 Clearly, donors viewed
Nigeria’s governance and economic policy environment as changing for the better.
The period of General Abacha’s rule was one of low levels of foreign aid and
developmental assistance to Nigeria due to the governance and economic policy environments
under military rule. This directly affected the early years covered in this study. During
Obasanjo’s first term, total ODA stayed relatively low by African standards. 152 Many
international donors steered away from sending money to Nigeria because of the record of the
poor quality of governance and economic policy - exemplified in the extremely high levels of
corruption in the government and severely poor industry infrastructure. For example, the World
Bank only began lending again to Nigeria in (fiscal year) FY2000, and did not have a Country
Office in Nigeria until 2002. 153 Establishing a Country Office at this time allowed the World
Bank to work closely with the Economic Reform Team in the government, thus greatly
influencing subsequent reforms. 154
Obasanjo’s second term (2003-2007) saw major increases in foreign aid, reflecting the
perceived success of his administration’s reforms. In just one year (2004/05), ODA shot up from
$578 million to $6416 million, making Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest recipient in 2005. In
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2006, ODA reached as high as $11434 million. 155 The increase in foreign aid was aimed at
supporting and implementing the new reform programs of the administration, especially the
NEEDS and SEEDS programs. The World Bank (in conjunction with the DFID (UK’s
Department for International Development) and often working with USAID, UNDP, the EU and
the African Development Bank) focused lending in the areas covered by the NEEDS three major
objectives: improving social services, fostering economic growth (especially in the agriculture,
manufacturing and non-oil sectors), and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
governance. 156

Conclusion– Foreign Aid and Corruption in Nigeria
This final section uses bar charts to show the progression of foreign aid and corruption in
Nigeria from 1998-2006. I ask the question: did the rise in foreign aid parallel a decrease in
political corruption in Nigeria, and thus result in improving policy and governance
environments? Figure 4 charts Nigeria’s CPI scores from 1998 to 2006, and Graph 5 charts
Nigeria’s receipt of ODA from 1998 to 2006.
According to Figure 4, there was actually a decline in CPI during Obasanjo’s first term
(showing a rise in perceptions of corruption), with an upturn in 2002. The high CPI score in 2002
was followed by a slight decline in 2003 – probably due to national and international perceptions
of political corruption surrounding the elections. In Obasanjo’s second term, there was a gradual
rise in CPI ratings, reflecting the success of his administration’s crackdown on corruption. One
major motivator of this crackdown was the creation of the EFCC and the Independent Corrupt
Practices Commission (ICPC), which prosecuted high-level politicians and recovered billions of
155
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stolen dollars during Obasanjo’s second term. 157 Another anticorruption act by the government
came in 2003, when Nigeria was one of the first countries to adopt the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) to help improve governance of the oil and gas sector. By the end
of his presidency in 2007, Obasanjo’s government had brought perceived corruption down to its
lowest levels during the study. 158
The levels of foreign aid shown in Graph 5 illustrate a positive relationship with the CPI
ratings in Figure 4 (and therefore, a negative relationship between foreign aid and corruption). If
we look closely at the 2002 – 2004 time segment, a rise in foreign aid actually precedes a rise in
CPI levels. In 2003, corruption was perceived to have risen (with the CPI falling from 1.6 to 1.4)
slightly, but Nigeria received more ODA in 2003 than in the previous year (from $294 million to
$308 million). This means that foreign aid was increased while perceptions of corruption in
Nigeria were worsening – thus, if the consensus is correct, corruption should have continued
worsening or stayed at the same level (since aid given to countries to worsening policy
environments does not serve to improve conditions) in the following years. However, after 2003,
perceptions of corruption in Nigeria continued to improve, and this paralleled further increases in
foreign aid. The increases in foreign aid between 1998 and 2006 do appear to be correlated with
improvements in the Nigerian government’s fiscal success, as well as relative improvements in
public services, human development, and unemployment.
The fact that Obasanjo’s administration was reform-minded and embraced the advice of
donors (especially that of the World Bank) can serve to support Burnside and Dollar’s finding
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that “countries with good policies and significant amounts of aid…perform very well.” 159 While
Nigeria did not complete its transformation into a good policy environment during this time
period, it was well on its way – at least, according to major donors. The fact that there was a
trend of improvements in fighting corruption towards the end of Obasanjo’s presidency,
paralleled with a tremendous rise in foreign aid, can also support the argument that foreign aid
can encourage a government to pursue corruption-fighting measures and improve governance
and economic policy. If one looks at the example of Nigeria under Obasanjo, it appears that
increases in foreign aid paralleled a decline in perceptions of political corruption – even in one of
the most corrupt countries in the world.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION
Review of Findings
High levels of political corruption are detrimental to growth and stabilization in
developing countries because it is an impediment to good governance and good economic
policies. Research on aid effectiveness has shown that foreign aid given to countries with poor
governance and poor economic policy environments does not aid growth and development, and
may actually do the reverse. Improving foreign aid effectiveness is crucial to developing the
Third World, and this study contributes to these efforts by examining perhaps the biggest
inhibitor to development and foreign aid effectiveness - corruption. A focused study of foreign
aid and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is badly needed at this time, as the major donors of the
world are increasing foreign aid to beat extreme poverty and underdevelopment in this povertystricken region. 160
This paper has taken two approaches to studying the effects of foreign aid on perceptions
of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. The quantitative approach used statistical analysis of
fourteen countries to test the effects of certain variables on perceptions of political corruption. To
investigate the relationship between foreign aid and perceptions of corruption, two models were
created using variables based on previous statistical research, and, in doing so, has expanded on
the body of knowledge already existing on the nature of corruption and foreign aid effectiveness.
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index provided annual ratings on
corruption, and these served as the dependent variable. The independent variable was foreign aid,
measured by the OECD’s statistic for net Official Development Assistance. It was hypothesized
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that countries with higher levels of ODA would be more likely to have higher levels of perceived
corruption (a lower CPI). Multiple regression analyses controlled for a number of variable that
previous research showed to be influential on corruption: ethnic-linguistic fractionalization,
population size, political rights, government expenditures as a share of GDP, and natural deposits
of energy resources (oil, coal and gas).
Simple bivariate correlations supported the hypothesis: ODA did have a negative effect
on the CPI, thus showing a positive relationship between foreign aid and perceived corruption.
However, regression analysis showed that the relationship between foreign aid and perceived
corruption was not as strong as the hypothesis proposed. The first model used the 1998-2006
averages for the variables, and was intended to show the relationship of foreign aid and
perceptions of corruption over time. While significant, foreign aid had only a slightly negative
effect on perceptions of corruption over the nine year period. The second model focused on the
effect that foreign aid had on perceptions of corruption over one year (2002-2003), and the
results pointed to the ineffectiveness of foreign aid to affect corruption in the short term. The
variable with the strongest correlation with perceptions of corruption was political rights; both
the regression models pointed to political rights as having the strongest influence on corruption.
The qualitative approach was a case study of Nigeria during Olusegun Obasanjo’s eight
years as president. This case study used the tenets of the theoretical consensus that foreign aid
given to a highly corrupt country only serves to perpetuate corruption. In Chapter 5, Nigeria’s
governance and economic policy environments were analyzed based on the success and
progression of reforms from 1999 to 2007. The Obasanjo administration’s policies towards
corruption resulted in improvements in perceptions of political corruption, and foreign aid was
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dramatically increased as a result. These findings can be used to both support and counter the
theoretical consensus: one the supporting side, Nigeria was clearly embracing reforms aimed at
improving governance and economic policy before foreign aid was increased; on the opposing
side, Nigeria received massive increases in foreign aid before perceptions of corruption
improved – and therefore it is possible that foreign aid actually aided in fighting political
corruption in Nigeria. Either way, in Nigeria’s case, increases in foreign aid did not result in
increased perceived corruption.

Increasing Foreign Aid in Corrupt Countries
It may appear that the statistical analysis of the fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries
does not explain the happenings in Nigeria. On average, the countries that received more foreign
aid were more likely to have higher perceptions of corruption. However, as Nigeria’s foreign aid
increased, perceptions of its political corruption decreased. If anything, this shows that donors
were aware of Nigeria’s changing policy environment, and of the effective anti-corruption
reforms Obasanjo’s regime were enacting. Because it was already reform-minded, the conditions
attached to the increasing foreign aid were more likely to be met by Nigeria’s government. This
paper’s study of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region, and of one of its countries in particular, is
useful because it shows that the effectiveness of foreign aid is determined by a close look at the
existing policy environment. On the surface, Nigeria’s persistently poor CPI ratings have labeled
it as highly corrupt, and that alone would support arguments against raising foreign aid to this
country. In the BBC article “Why Aid Doesn’t Work”, Fredrik Erixon argues that “if nothing
else, aid to Africa seems to have lowered rather than increased economic growth….. The tragedy
of aid, as been shown in numerous evaluations and by World Bank research, is that donors are
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part of the problem of corruption; aid often underpins corruption, and higher aid levels tend to
erode the governance structure of poor countries.” 161 In 1999, a paper from the U.S. House of
Representative’s Joint Economic Committee Study’s Vice Chairman Jim Saxton suggested that,
“minimizing IMF lending is one obvious way to prevent IMF assistance from promoting
corruption”. 162 In the CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS (2001), suggestions like “abolish the
U.S Agency for International Development and end traditional government-to-government aid
programs” and “stop using foreign aid to encourage or reward market reforms” were made to the
U.S. Congress. 163 These arguments overlook the cases like Nigeria, where foreign aid has
assisted in the fight against corruption.
Overall, this study’s findings are congruent with the consensus that reform-minded
governments are much more likely to use foreign aid effectively. Even though perceptions of
corruption in Nigeria remain high, and the governance and economic policy environments have
far to go before they can be considered “good”, increases in foreign aid have paralleled
improvements. It does appear that the argument that policy reform, not foreign aid, is the key to
development gains support by this study’s findings. Drawing from the strongly negative
relationship between political rights and corruption, political and economic reforms are central to
the fight against corruption. Foreign aid can be highly successful when it is directed at SubSaharan African countries who are concentrating on reforming governance and economic policy,
even if they are still far from achieving it.
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On Foreign Aid Policy
Since this study’s findings lend credence to the consensus, it should come as no surprise
that they reflect the current trend in actual lending policy. The former trend of giving aid more
for geopolitical purposes than for supporting countries invested in positive change has been
largely redirected as a result of the widespread acceptance of the need for targeting aid at
countries with improving governance and economic environments. 164 A 2004 IMF study found
that the drive for better aid effectiveness has led donors to increase their selectivity in giving aid;
and the results have shown a difference in aid effectiveness: donors are directing aid to
governments with better civil liberties and political rights, recognizing a need to improve aid
quality (“by reducing the number of agencies involved in disbursing aid, harmonizing aid
procedures to reduce compliance costs for the recipients, eliminating tied aid, and aligning aid
priorities with the countries' own policy priorities”), and recipients are improving their public
resource management. 165 These results reflect a hopeful trend in improving aid effectiveness in
development of countries in need.
In conclusion, this study points to the need for donors to devote great attention and
research into recipients’ commitment to reform. Often, this means working intimately with
experts and communities within recipient countries. Foreign aid must be targeted at the reform
needs of each country in order to be effective in meeting the development needs of the country –
and also to prevent the waste of resources aid can provide, through supporting poor, destructive
policy environments. The success of Nigeria’s anti-corruption measures and economic reforms
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resulted in foreign aid increases, and the foreign aid increases lent resources to support the
continuation of such reforms. Sub-Saharan African countries are in need of well-targeted aid that
helps to support reform; and the populations of these countries need foreign aid to be directed at
improving their welfare. Foreign aid has supported non reform-minded governments in the past
(often autocratic, suppressive regimes), and must now be targeted at those governments
committed to building good governance and economic policies that lead to development of the
country as a whole. 166 This, in short, will allow the flow of aid to be an infusion of greatly
needed resources – instead of a crutch for inefficiency.
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Table 1: Bivariate Correlations

Political Government
CPI
Rights expenditures
rating
Country's rating
as a
average
2006
average percentage
for
Country's
population
for
of GDP
1998ethnic
size in
1998- average for
2006 fractionalization millions
2006
1996-2006
CPI rating
Pearson
average for 1998- Correlation
2006
Sig. (1tailed)
N
Country's ethnic
fractionalization

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1tailed)
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.222

-.625**
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.413
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Government
expenditures as a
percentage of
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Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1tailed)
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Pearson
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Political Government
CPI
Rights expenditures
rating
Country's rating
as a
average
2006
average percentage
for
Country's
population
for
of GDP
1998ethnic
size in
1998- average for
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2006
1996-2006
Country has
natural resource
deposits of
natural gas, oil or
coal

Pearson
Correlation

.065

-.213
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-.024
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Sig. (1tailed)

.413
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.363

.467

.415
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.222
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GDP average for Pearson
Correlation
1998-2006 in
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Sig. (1tailed)
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Average ODA for Pearson
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Country
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.141

.268

.315

14.000

14

14

.271
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Pearson
R
-.402

Significance
(One-Tailed)
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Oil, Gas, Coal
Deposits

.065

.413
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GDP average
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.222

.222
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Government
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-.036

.451
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Table 3: Regression Model 1

Model Summary
Model
1

R

R Square
a

.982

Adjusted R Square

.964

Std. Error of the
Estimate

.933

.3316

a. Predictors: (Constant), Country's 2006 population size in millions, Political
Rights rating average for 1998-2006, Country has natural resource deposits
of natural gas, oil or coal, Country's ethnic fractionalization, Government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP average for 1996-2006, Average ODA
in USD millions for 1998-2006

a

Coefficients

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

6.060

.947

Average ODA in USD
millions for 1998-2006

-.001

.000

Country has natural resource
deposits of natural gas, oil or
coal

.260

Government expenditures as
a percentage of GDP
average for 1996-2006
Political Rights rating
average for 1998-2006
Country's ethnic
fractionalization
Country's 2006 population
size in millions

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

6.398

.000

-.560

-3.126

.017

.238

.087

1.092

.311

.031

.016

.263

1.953

.092

-.478

.056

-.653

-8.481

.000

-1.115

.964

-.125

-1.157

.285

.000

.007

-.020

-.101

.922

a. Dependent Variable: CPI rating average for 1998-2006
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Table 4: Regression Model 2

Model Summary
Model
1

R

R Square
a

.954

Adjusted R Square

.910

Std. Error of the
Estimate

.833

.5043

a. Predictors: (Constant), Population 2002, Political Rights rating in 2002,
Country has natural resource deposits of natural gas, oil or coal, ODA
received in 2002, Country's ethnic fractionalization, GDP in billions for 2002

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error
7.578

1.275

.000

.001

Political Rights rating in 2002

-.532

Country has natural resource
deposits of natural gas, oil or
coal

ODA received in 2002

Country's ethnic
fractionalization
GDP in billions for 2002
Population 2002

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

5.943

.001

-.049

-.276

.790

.094

-.755

-5.631

.001

-.533

.403

-.183

-1.320

.228

-2.124

1.616

-.247

-1.314

.230

.001

.009

.034

.152

.884

-.013

.009

-.337

-1.505

.176

a. Dependent Variable: CPI rating for 2003
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